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ABSTRACT
Since the completion of the Eastern enlargement in 2004, a major responsibility for addressing 
the Baltic Sea pollution lies with the European Union. It provides strong institutions to facilitate 
environmental decision-making and to enforce the implementation of regulations. However, the 
measures taken so far have not been sufficient to significantly improve the state of the Baltic Sea. 
In particular, the Common Agricultural Policy does not take the ecological characteristics of the 
region into consideration. Instead, it provides false incentives since it generally encourages farmers to 
increase production and to extend areas under cultivation. To enhance the EU’s role, it is crucial to 
raise the awareness of the Baltic Sea’s vulnerability in Brussels. Moreover, European regulations and 
policies should become more flexible and match the regional specific environmental requirements. 
At the same time, too heavy financial burdens and distortions of competition, especially for the 
region’s agricultural sector, should be avoided.
INTRODUCTION
The Baltic Sea is often referred to as one of the most polluted seas in the world, whereby 
eutrophication constitutes the main threat to its marine environment (McGroarty 2008). While 
adverse natural conditions certainly contribute to the problem, eutrophication of the Baltic 
Sea is mainly caused by anthropogenic nutrient inputs. The major sources are nitrogen and 
phosphorus discharges from agricultural production and municipal waste water. In addition, 
emissions from the traffic and energy sectors as well as from agriculture contribute to the 
atmospheric deposition of nitrogen to the Baltic Sea. Eutrophication has adverse consequences 
for the marine ecosystem, such as widespread, sometimes toxic, algae blooms and oxygen 
depletion, especially in deeper waters, both leading to the death of organisms including fish 
(HELCOM 2009: 11). 1
Since 1974, international efforts to protect the Baltic Sea have mainly been carried out within 
the framework of the Helsinki Convention and its governing body, the Helsinki Commission 
(HELCOM), which has provided a central arena for the development of common approaches 
while involving all littoral states. However, the latter’s key position can be questioned as a 
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consequence of the 2004 completed EU’s Eastern enlargement (Kern and Löffelsend 2008: 
117). Due to three developments, it can be claimed that the EU today has replaced the Helsinki 
Convention as the potentially most important international institution in terms of combating 
the Baltic Sea eutrophication. 
First, the Baltic Sea has almost become an internal sea of the EU, with Russia remaining the 
only non-member state among its coastal states. Furthermore, even the EU member states that 
are not situated in the Baltic Sea region, such as Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Belgium 
likewise contribute to nutrient inputs through atmospheric deposition. Moreover, due to its 
strong political weight and economic power, the EU has the potential to involve even non-
member states such as Russia and Belarus into protection measures.2 
Second, the EU has strong institutional capacities to facilitate decision-making and to en-
force the implementation of imposed regulations. Of particular relevance in this respect is the 
supranational character of policy making, e.g., through majority voting, and of central actors, 
e.g., the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice 
which discerns the EU from any other international organizations that may be relevant in the 
context of combating the Baltic Sea eutrophication. 
Third, the EU holds competences within most of the policy fields that are relevant for the 
protection of the Baltic Sea, among others water and air protection, traffic, transport, fisheries 
and maritime affairs. Also, in this respect it differs from the majority of international environ-
mental conventions which are often specialized on a particular problem but lack the necessary 
scope of actions to develop cross-sectoral abatement strategies. Of particular importance in 
this regard is the fact that agriculture which, on the one hand, constitutes the most important 
single source of the Baltic Sea pollution, on the other hand represents the policy sector within 
the EU where regulation competences have most consequently been transferred to the com-
munity level (Feindt 2008: 191). 
This paper tries to answer the question why European efforts to save the Baltic Sea so far 
have failed in spite of the above-mentioned promising starting conditions. The first chapter will 
critically evaluate those of the EU’s regulations within the context of water protection, marine 
protection, air pollution control and agricultural policy, which are relevant for addressing the 
Baltic Sea eutrophication. In the second chapter, the reasons for the EU’s weaknesses will be 
analyzed, with a special focus on the role of environmental associations. Finally, suggestions 
for improvements will be presented.
THE EU’S PROTECTION POLICIES
Wa t e r  p r o t e c t i o n
One of the first community activities that had been driven by concerns about the deteriora-
ting quality of European waters was the adoption of the Bathing Water Directive in 1975. In 
this initial phase, however, the intention was to establish common rules and parameters for 
2  E.g., under the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership, see Nechiporuk  et al. (2011: 49).
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the monitoring and definition of bathing water quality rather than to introduce abatement 
measures. The directive urges authorities to check nitrates and phosphates “when there is a 
tendency towards the eutrophication of water” (Council of the EC 1976: 7). 
The Bathing Water Directive, together with the 1980 Drinking Water Directive, indicates 
that the European legislation on water pollution was initially motivated by the interest to 
protect the end-user (e.g., the swimmer or the consumer) and not so much the environment 
in general. This attitude changed in the 1990s. It then turned out that, in order to achieve 
the established targets for water quality, it would be necessary to address the pollution at 
source. The new approach was additionally enhanced through the Single European Act and 
the Maastricht Treaty, which introduced environmental protection as an independent policy 
goal of the European Union. Moreover, the serious state of the North Sea, in which heavy algal 
blooms repeatedly occurred during the 1980s, triggered a Council Resolution in 1988, which 
required the Commission to present proposals to address the problem (Prat 1990: 103). As a 
consequence, two of the hitherto main regulations in terms of combating eutrophication, the 
Urban Waste Water Directive and the Nitrates Directive, were adopted in 1991.   
In order to take different regional conditions into account, both directives allow the possibility 
of a flexible implementation. Thus, they discern between sensitive and less sensitive areas as far 
as susceptibility to eutrophication is concerned and accordingly prescribe different standards in 
terms of sewage treatment and farming practices. While this has worked quite well in the case 
of the Urban Waste Water Directive, the implementation of the Nitrates Directive turned out 
to be more difficult. Several member states, including many in the Baltic Sea catchment area, 
e.g., Sweden and Poland, only designated relatively small parts of their territory as Nitrates 
Vulnerable Zones (IEEP 2007: 14). One reason for this reluctance seems to be the concern 
that the farming sector in the regions that fully comply with the requirements of the directive 
would lose its competitiveness against the regions that are less susceptible to eutrophication 
and therefore do not have to impose similar strict standards (European Parliament 2000: 6).  
However, a HELCOM study revealed that even a consequent improvement of manure han-
dling in accordance with the standards of the Nitrates Directive within all HELCOM contracting 
states would only bring about a marginal success. Because of the still rather weak provisions, 
only a maximum reduction of 6% of nitrogen runoffs to the sea could be expected. This would 
constitute a far too little improvement, taking into consideration the particular sensitivity of 
the Baltic Sea ecosystem (HELCOM 2006: 21).  
A totally new approach in the EU’s environmental policies has emerged at the turn of the 
millennium. Instead of addressing various polluters and pollution sources independently, the 
new idea was to develop broader goal-oriented strategies and thus to integrate various environ-
mental objectives in one comprehensive act of legislation. The Water Framework Directive (WFD) 
adopted in 2000, thus sets the overall goal to reach a “good status” in European surface- and 
groundwater by the year 2015.3 Member states are required to develop comprehensive River 
3  “Good status” is among others, defined by the absence of “accelerated growth of algae” and the situa-
tion when “nutrient concentrations do not exceed the levels established so as to ensure the functioning of the 
ecosystem” (Council of the EU 2000: 48–49). 
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Basin Management Action Plans (RBMPs), hereby to actively involve “all interested parties” 
and, where necessary, to engage in trans-border cooperation.  
Basically, it is the intention of the WFD to “contribute to the protection of territorial and marine 
waters”. It even explicitly refers to the goals of the European regional seas’ conventions when 
stating that “this Directive is to make a contribution“, to meet the obligations that result from 
these conventions. However, in a direct binding sense, the WFD applies only to the EU’s “coastal 
waters” which are defined as a rather narrow strip of up to one nautical mile from the coast.4 
Another weakness of the WFD is the lack of concretely prescribed measures which the 
member states have to impose when implementing the directive. What is more, it provides 
quite extensive provisions for exemptions, which give member states the right to extend the 
deadline for reaching a good environmental status not in 2015 but in 2027, for example, in cases 
of difficult “natural conditions” or if measures would be “disproportionately expensive”. It is 
thus expected that in 50% of cases RBMPs will not lead to the achievement of “good status” 
by 2015 (Dworak et al. 2010). 
M a r i n e  p r o t e c t i o n
Only after the turn of the millennium the EU has started to acknowledge marine protection as 
an independent policy goal. This was due to two developments. First, the Amsterdam Treaty 
of 1997 once more strengthened the position of environmental protection vis-à-vis other 
Community objectives. As a consequence, in 2002, the  Sixth Community Environment Action 
Programme was adopted, which called for the development of “a thematic strategy for the 
protection and conservation of the marine environment” latest by 2005. 
Second, the EU had, not least as a consequence of the Lisbon Strategy of 2000, “discovered” 
the maritime dimension as a hitherto underestimated opportunity for the promotion of econo-
mic growth. Thus, in 2006 the European Commission published the “Green Paper on a Future 
Maritime Policy”, which proposes a better coordination of traditional maritime branches and 
outlines possibilities for new business opportunities, e.g., within areas like offshore renewables, 
raw material extraction or marine biotechnology. At the same time, the Green Paper emphasizes 
the importance of the healthy nature as a prerequisite for economic activities like tourism and 
fisheries, but also for the realization of “non-market values”, e.g., recreational activities or the 
pleasure of enjoying “the coast’s scenic benefits” (European Commission 2006: 24). To enable 
the consideration of these aspects, the Green Paper calls also for the adoption of a thematic 
strategy for the marine environment, which should serve as the “environmental pillar” of the 
future maritime policy.  
The European Parliament and the Council adopted the Marine Strategy Framework Directive 
(MSFD) in 2008 (Council of the EU 2008). Similarly to the Water Framework Directive, it aims 
at tackling marine pollution by providing a cross-sectoral framework intended to cover all the 
main pollution sources and by setting a time limit, in this case the year 2020, by which a good 
environmental status (GES) must be achieved. However, the responsibility for developing and 
4  One nautical mile corresponds to 1.852 kilometers.
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implementing such measures is to a large extent handed over to the member states. They are 
required to develop national marine strategies according to the environmental situation of 
the respective seas to which they are bordering. They hereby should “take into account” the 
targets that are laid down in the regional sea conventions.
The degree to which the marine strategy hands over the responsibility to the national level 
appears to be rather counterproductive (Bertram and Rehdanz 2012: 11). For a successful 
realization of its objectives, a stronger commitment of the European level and a more binding 
inclusion of the regional level would have constituted a major advantage. Due to the trans-
boundary character of marine pollution, it would have been more natural if the directive had 
urged the member states to develop joint marine strategies with regard to each of Europe’s 
marine regions. Instead, in adopting national strategies, there is an inherent risk of differently 
ambitious targets and uncoordinated measures within one and the same marine region (Sa-
lomon 2009: 363). 
Another weakness of the MSFD can be its reluctance to set ambitious targets for the integra-
tion of sectoral Community policies into the overall efforts for achieving a good environmental 
status of the marine regions. Whereas the strategy generally states that the new framework 
for marine protection policies should “foster the integration of environmental concerns into 
other policies, such as the Common Fisheries Policy, the Common Agricultural Policy and other 
relevant Community policies”, it subsequently does not determine a possible proceeding which 
could lead to the demanded integration of sector policies. This applies especially to the CAP, 
which is not particularly addressed throughout the rest of the directive. Furthermore, emissions 
from shipping, which likewise account for a major pressure on Europe’s marine environments, 
are not at all addressed within the marine strategy.
The directive generously allows exceptions from the target to reach GES by 2020. Article 
14 thus opens the possibility that member states may not achieve this goal in case of “natural 
conditions which do not allow timely improvement” or if environmental damages result from 
“actions taken for reasons of overriding public interest which outweigh the negative impact on 
the environment.” Member states may even abstain from fully implementing the directive if 
“the costs would be disproportionate taking account of the risks to the marine environment”. 
Although the directive requires that these exceptions should not permanently preclude the 
achievement of GES in the concerned marine waters, it does not provide a clear time limit by 
which the exception should end at the latest. 
A i r  p o l l u t i o n  co n t r o l
In spite of the significant extent to which air pollution contributes to nutrient enrichments in 
European waters and soils, the aim to combat eutrophication has never been a major driving 
force for the development of the European air protection policies. Instead, the Community 
policies that emerged in the 1980s with the objective to address air pollution had primarily been 
driven by the intention to address problems like acidification and the formation of ground-level 
ozone and the resulting pressures on nature and human health. Although important legislative 
acts, e.g., the Large Combustion Plant Directive (1988) and the Integrated Pollution Preven-
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tion and Control Directive (1996) certainly had positive effects in terms of reducing nitrogen 
emissions and thus addresssd an important source of the Baltic Sea eutrophication, the latter 
aspect was at best seen as a positive side effect but not as the main driving force. Only after the 
turn of the millennium the fight against eutrophication acquired a more independent position 
within the EU’s air pollution control policy. An important step in that direction was made in 
the form of the 2001 National Emission Ceilings Directive (NECD). However, due to the priority 
which for a long time had been given to the fight against acidification within the European air 
protection policies, achievements in emission reduction are not equally distributed as regards 
various pollutants. While sulfur emissions have been sharply reduced in the EU between 1990 
and 2010 and even nitrogen oxides emissions have decreased significantly, almost no reduction 
in ammonia emissions could be achieved during the last decades.  
Although the European Commission in the recent years has acknowledged the need to 
address eutrophication through air pollution control measures, its realization has suffered 
from a clash with other objectives of the European environmental politics, in particular the 
fight with the climate change. Thus, the EU is promoting a shift from road to sea transport in 
order to make use of the fact that the latter produces considerably less CO2 per ton-kilometer 
as compared with road transport. However, the concept of establishing “motorways of the 
sea” (European Commission 2001) neglects the fact that ships release about twice as much 
NOx than do modern truck models (EEB 2004). 
A similar conflict also exists as regards the road traffic. Here, the concern about climate change 
has led to the promotion of vehicles driven by diesel instead of gasoline as a way to reduce 
petrol consumption. However, the fact that the former produce up to three times more NOx 
emissions than the latter had been neglected for several years (Vestreng et al. 2009). Finally, it 
is also striking that the revision and strengthening of the NECD, which was originally scheduled 
for 2004, has been repeatedly postponed. A further delay until 2014 seems to be possible. The 
failure to adequately make use of such an important tool of addressing atmospheric nutrient 
depositions has been explained by the need to offer some member states compensation in 
exchange for their approval of the EU’s climate and energy package in 2007 (Ågren 2008).5
Ag r i c u l t u ra l  p o l i c y
The hitherto most far reaching attempt to include environmental considerations into the design 
of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is related to the Luxembourg Declarations of 2003. The 
reform introduced Cross Compliance as a new policy tool, which implies that direct financial 
support is only paid to farmers who adhere to regulations on environmental protection. Moreo-
ver, the Luxembourg Declarations had formerly introduced a rural development policy, including 
agri-environmental programs, as a second pillar of the CAP. The Strategic Guidelines for Rural 
Development point to the problem of water pollution from agriculture and explicitly call for 
taking into account “soil protection, protection and conservation of the marine environment”.6
5  Two officials, Swedish Ministry of the Environment, 16.06.2010.
6  European Union, 2006; this passage is remarkable since it is the first time ever that the need to protect the 
marine environment is mentioned in the context of the EU’s agricultural policy. See Guttenstein (2007: 13).
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Thus, basically, a framework has been created for considering marine protection require-
ments in European agriculture. However, the extent to which agri-environmental programs 
are actually imposed depends almost completely on the member states and the farmers. 
Some constraints may prevent the agri-environmental programs from becoming an effective 
instrument for water protection policies. First, their implementation depends on the ability of 
the member states to provide funding for co-financing. The old member states have to allocate 
50%, the new member states 25% of the total costs from their national budgets. The result 
is that not all financial resources which the EU has allocated for the purpose are in fact used, 
because member states are reluctant to pay their share. 
Second, a potential weakness is related to the fact that member states have quite a lot of 
freedom of action in defining which kind of measures they actually want to pursue as part of 
rural development actions. Thus, national governments might choose to primarily support socio-
economic projects and only allocate the legally required minimum support to environmental 
measures. But even the money that goes to environmental projects has not necessarily to be 
directed to water protection measures. There is no legal obligation for that at all (EEA 2006: 
37). If member states decide to prioritize other environmental goals like, for instance, the 
mitigation of hazardous effects of pesticides, this could ultimately lead to the situation when 
no agri-environmental programs that could contribute to combat the eutrophication of marine 
waters are being established (Guttenstein 2007: 13).   
Finally, the Luxembourg Declarations have not removed the major basic weaknesses of the 
CAP. These are insufficient environmental protection standards (e.g., in the Nitrates Directive) 
and the fact that the CAP is generally encouraging farmers to continuously increase agricultural 
production, e.g., by moving towards highly specialized and intensive large-scale farming and by 
increasing the areas that are under cultivation. This tendency has been additionally enhanced 
by the EU’s recent call for increasing the cultivation of energy crops (Scheuer and Rouillard 
2009: 38). Even in the regions that are highly susceptible to eutrophication, i.e. the Baltic Sea 
catchment area, farmers can hardly escape these false incentives of the CAP, since this might 
lead to lower yields and thus to a loss of competitiveness against the regions where agricultural 
production is not to the same extent questioned by environmental constraints.
EXPLAINING THE WEAKNESSES 
T h e  l a c k  o f  a wa r e n e s s  a t  t h e  E u r o p e a n  l e v e l
In Brussels, the awareness of threats to the EU’s marine environment seems to be biased, as 
often more attention is given to the seas in the west and the south than to the Baltic Sea.7 This 
may be due to the fact that most of the Baltic Sea states are relatively new members in the EU 
and thus have had less time and opportunity to impact views and political processes within the 
European bureaucracy. Moreover, the Baltic Sea states have so far not sufficiently managed to 
occupy marine-protection-related staff positions in the European Commission. 
7  Several interviewees in the European Commission pointed to the development of the EU’s Integrated Maritime 
Policy as an example for a political process in which interests of Atlantic member states had dominated the agenda. 
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Paradoxically, the Baltic Sea Region seems to suffer from the positive image which Northern 
Europe has generally acquired in the area of environmental protection. This positive reputa-
tion has facilitated the emergence of a false impression among European policy makers who 
tend to believe that the Baltic Sea is among the cleanest marine waters in Europe, instead of 
acknowledging that exactly the opposite is correct. But even in the cases when policy-makers 
know about the true environmental situation of the Baltic Sea, they do not naturally draw the 
conclusion that much priority should be given to actions at the European level. This has again to 
do with the positive reputation of Northern European governance structures and, in particular, 
of the Helsinki Commission which is very often pointed out as a role model for cooperation in 
marine protection at a regional sea level. Consequently, there is a widespread impression that 
the Baltic Sea states must be very well prepared to deal with any regional specific environmental 
problems on their own instead of asking the European Union to push forward the protective 
actions for the Baltic Sea. 
The lack of awareness for the Baltic Sea’s serious environmental situation is further rein-
forced by the conditions for political deliberations that characterize the work of the European 
Commission. If seen from the Brussels perspective, the Baltic Sea region is often perceived as 
being located within a rather remote corner of Europe.8 This does not only result in a reduced 
awareness for the region, but also has consequences in very practical terms. The remoteness 
is limiting the opportunities of environmental activists from the Baltic Sea region to make their 
voices heard in European politics. If, for instance, workshops are arranged in Brussels with 
the intention to influence decision-making processes in the European maritime policies, it is 
easier for NGO representatives from Belgium and the surrounding countries (e.g., from Paris, 
Amsterdam or London) to participate than it is for those who are residing in the Baltic Sea 
region, who would have to spend much more time and money for the trip to Brussels.9 Thus, 
it is more likely that environmental concerns, which are represented by the major European 
NGOs with headquarters in and around Brussels and which are important in the pan-European 
perspective, are being considered within the European policy-making more often than those 
that are mainly relevant for a particular sub-region.
I n s u f f i c i e n t  N G O  i n v o l v e m e n t
Generally, the representation of the Baltic Sea’s specific environmental interests at the NGO 
level in Brussels does not seem to work in a perfect way. Although environmental NGOs are 
well developed in most of the Baltic Sea states and enjoy a high reputation, their functional 
link to the European level is not strong enough. Their activities are targeted very much towards 
national or macro-regional actors (HELCOM), instead of seeking channels to influence the core 
European actors such as the European Commission. There is an unintended, rather invisible 
dividing line between NGO activities that take place at a pan-European level, directed to the 
central actors in Brussels and aiming to address environmental problems that are relevant 
8  Official at the Brussels based West Finland European Office, 02.12.2009.
9  Official, European Commission, 07.09.2010.
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for the EU as a whole on the one hand and those who more or less exclusively focus on the 
situation of the Baltic Sea on the other.  
Among the all-European environmental organizations with offices in Brussels, there are those 
who are very prominent in the public, e.g., Greenpeace, WWF, or Friends of the Earth. They 
frequently manage to get the media coverage and thus play an important role in shaping the 
awareness of urgent challenges such as, for instance, climate change, accidental pollution (e.g., 
oil spills from tankers or oil-platforms) or threats related to Genetic Modified Food.10 Thus, it 
is relatively easy to place such kinds of concerns high on the EU’s political agenda. In contrast, 
the eutrophication of marine waters is not a topic pushed forward by those prominent NGOs. 
In not doing so, they are just reflecting the views predominant in most of the member states 
where eutrophication is neither perceived as a relevant issue nor something which is likely to 
make the headlines.
At the European level, Seas at Risk has specialized in lobbying for marine protection. Through 
its office in Brussels, this NGO has a realistic chance to impact decision-making processes within 
the EU. However, one of the organization’s policy officers has openly admitted that “eutrophi-
cation issues, to be honest, are not part of Seas at Risk’s expertise.”11 Instead, she referred to 
the expertise and activities of the Coalition Clean Baltic which, as an umbrella organization 
of various environmental organizations in the Baltic Sea region, has specialized on the sea’s 
particular challenges and especially on the fight against the Baltic Sea eutrophication. Located 
in Uppsala, the Coalition Clean Baltic indeed plays a significant role in deliberations on marine 
protection policies around the Baltic Sea and within the HELCOM framework. However, the 
organization is naturally not sufficiently involved in policy-making processes at the EU level, as 
this would require a stronger presence in Brussels.
The unbalanced representation of the Baltic Sea environmental interests at the NGO level 
can be exemplified by the way in which position papers intended to impact the ongoing CAP 
reform for the financial period 2013–2020 are being presented. Various environmental NGOs 
have contributed to the consultation process. However, none of their position papers refer to the 
harmful consequences of agricultural activities on the particularly sensitive marine environment 
of the Baltic Sea. No contribution has been delivered to the consultation by Seas at Risk.12  
Since the work of environmental associations at the EU level to a large extent depends on 
funding by the European Commission, the missing focus on the Baltic Sea specific problems 
reflects the already described lack of awareness in the Brussels bureaucracy. More generally, 
the weak position of combating marine eutrophication in the contributions of European NGOs 
to environmental debates is a consequence of the largely non-alarming and non-visible manner 
in which the problem in most European countries is experienced. Thus, it is much easier for 
10  Among the press releases published by Greenpeace, ca. 95% of those related to agriculture are contribut-
ing to the debate on GMOs. Moreover, 80% of the organization’s press releases related to maritime policies 
are dealing with fishery issues. In contrast, marine eutrophication is almost a non-issue in the publications by 
Greenpeace. 
11  E-mail to the author on 19.11.2009. 
12  The position papers are made available for the public by the European Commission on: http://ec.europa.
eu/agriculture/cap-post-2013/debate/contributions/index_en.htm#contributor2
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accidental ecological catastrophes like oil spills from tank ships or drilling platforms to make 
headlines than to scandalize oxygen depletion in deep water layers. The latter remains a rather 
abstract notion, which is difficult for the media to illustrate (Richards and Heard 2005: 25). 
It is not easy to explain, and the responsibility can hardly be assigned directly. Thus, societal 
actors like environmental NGOs and the media, who otherwise would be expected to take over 
the role of advocating marine protection, are rather reluctant to pick up the subject as they 
cannot expect to benefit much from it in terms of public recognition, new members, additional 
readers or donations.  
T h e  r e g u l a t i o n  g a p  a t  t h e  m a c r o - r e g i o n a l  l e v e l
Involving the EU in the Baltic Sea protection implies the challenge to cope with a certain ten-
sion. On the one hand, there is no way to address the Baltic Sea eutrophication without giving 
the EU a decisive role to play. This is because competences within the relevant policy areas 
are largely located at the community level, and only the EU institutions have the capacity to 
facilitate effective policy-making processes across the various involved sectors and to enforce 
the implementation of and compliance with the decided regulations. On the other hand, it 
should be taken into consideration that only the minority of the EU member states are directly 
and profoundly interested in cleaning up the Baltic Sea. Moreover, even those actors and states 
who as bordering states in principle might be interested in the sea’s environmental situation 
could, as a consequence of other overriding priorities in European politics, be reluctant to fully 
make use of the EU’s potential to develop effective Baltic Sea protection measures.
One strategy to overcome this tension would be to strive for general solutions from which not 
only the Baltic Sea region but also other countries and regions throughout the EU could benefit. 
In fact, this has so far been the dominant approach in the development of European water and 
marine protection policies. It is the reason why, for instance, both the Urban Waste Water Directive 
and the Nitrates Directive imply a considerable degree of flexibility. With the intention to address 
the rather different environmental needs throughout Europe, they require stricter standards for 
wastewater treatment and fertilizer application, depending on whether the affected regions are 
suffering or not from eutrophication. Also, the Common Agricultural Policy, in particular through 
its second pillar, provides the opportunities which are open for a flexible adoption of measures 
at a member state level according to their specific environmental requirements.  
This middle-of-the-road approach to harmonizing environmental legislation throughout 
Europe, while maintaining a certain amount of flexibility, has so far been a successful strategy, 
as it has contributed to improve water environments in several member states and marine 
areas. However, it has turned out that the inherent degree of flexibility is not sufficient to solve 
the problem of the Baltic Sea eutrophication. Both the above-mentioned directives would not 
entail considerable improvements for this sea, even if each Baltic Sea state would implement 
them in the strictest possible way, i.e. include an 80% removal of phosphates in wastewater 
treatment and declare the whole Baltic Sea catchment area as a Nitrates Vulnerable Zone. 
Furthermore, the Common Agricultural Policy in its current state by far does not include 
those kinds of flexible mechanisms that would be necessary to prevent the further deterioration 
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of the Baltic Sea environment, which indeed has to be expected if the current CAP regulations 
would be extended to Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in the financial period after 2013 
(Larsson and Granstedt 2010). 
When developing the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, the EU has made some attempts 
to acknowledge that particular marine regions may need specific policy approaches and tailor 
made regulations. These considerations have been accompanied by a fundamental debate 
on the question whether and to which extent the macro-regional level should constitute an 
independent dimension in developing the EU legislation. The issue has unveiled conflicting 
positions among the European Commission, the European Parliament, and different groups of 
member states whose arguments in turn have influenced the position of the Council. 
In a report on the Commission’s proposal for a MSFD, the European Parliament suggested 
that, in addition to the proposal of the Commission, according to which member states should 
develop national marine strategies on their own, the directive should also require that “Member 
States sharing a Marine Region shall ensure that a single, joint Marine Strategy is produced per 
region or sub-region”. The implementation and monitoring of these macro-regional strategies 
should then be assisted by management units that likewise should be installed jointly for the 
respective marine regions (European Parliament 2006a). 
A more far-reaching proposal by the European Parliament even suggested the possibility 
to designate specific marine regions as pilot areas (European Parliament 2006b). Accordingly, 
the member states that share a common marine region should have the possibility to agree on 
greater efforts to move ahead within their group, if compared to the general European time 
schedule. Such a pilot area should then officially be acknowledged by the European Commission. 
The further going efforts of member states within a pilot area should then be supported by the 
EU among others through providing additional financial support.
The idea of creating pilot areas was even further substantiated through an additional sug-
gestion of the European Parliament, according to which the Baltic Sea region should explicitly 
be mentioned in the MSFD as a possible first pilot area. The HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan 
should then serve as a tool for achieving the objectives of a pilot program. This suggestion 
constitutes an interesting move as its realization would definitely have left behind the hitherto 
applied principle of striving for general solutions when developing the new EU legislation. 
Instead, the Baltic Sea would have explicitly been singled out as an area which needs to be 
treated differently from the other parts of Europe. 
The European Parliament’s idea to add a strong macro-regional dimension to the EU’s MSFD 
was subsequently weakened by objections from the Council and the European Commission. 
During the Council deliberations in 2006, the delegations of the member states expressed rather 
different attitudes towards the idea of developing joint marine strategies at the macro-regional 
level instead of applying national approaches. A clear discrepancy between the Northern and 
the Southern European countries became visible. On the one hand, delegations from the Baltic 
Sea states, in particular those from Latvia, Sweden, Lithuania, and Estonia, very clearly advoca-
ted macro-regional approaches, i.e. they required the development of joint marine strategies 
and the establishment of legally binding links to the targets set by regional sea conventions. 
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In contrast, France as well as Cyprus expressed reservations. They pointed to the fact that the 
Mediterranean region, in contrast to other European marine regions, is bordered more by third 
countries than by member states. Given this broader variety within the region, they argued 
that it would be rather difficult to establish a strong and efficient Mediterranean convention 
to take over central tasks in implementing the EU’s MSFD. 
However, France did not completely reject the idea of giving regional conventions a binding 
role within the EU’s legal framework. Referring to positive examples, e.g., cases in which the 
European Court of Justice had based its decisions on the Barcelona and UNCLOS Conventions, 
the French government suggested to select carefully and determine explicitly which of the 
various marine conventions in fact would be appropriate to be used to fulfil the requirements 
of the MSFD. The strongest reservations against giving marine conventions a binding role in 
the implementation of the EU law were expressed by Germany which stressed the difficulty 
to find a clear and legally correct formulation for the relationship between both institutional 
levels. Moreover, the German government expressed concerns that any kind of macro-regio-
nal differentiation within the EU could result in distorted conditions of competition and thus 
undermine the single market principle (Council of the EU 2006).     
In the end, it turned out that the strong emphasis on promoting macro-regional approaches 
within the context of the MSFD mainly got support from the Nordic and Baltic states, whereas 
the rest of the EU member states either held an indifferent position or directly rejected the 
suggestion. In the concluding statement, the Council justified its definitive refusal to require 
the development of joint single marine strategies per region by the argument that this would 
dilute the legal responsibility for compliance among the member states. The Council made it 
clear that generally only a national state can bear the ultimate responsibility for meeting obli-
gations under the Community legislation (Council of the EU 2007). Moreover, the Council also 
rejected the idea of giving the existing marine conventions a binding legal role and to explicitly 
mention the Baltic Sea region as a possible pilot area within the MSFD. Instead, only a weak, 
non-binding formulation was taken up, according to which member states “as far as possible” 
shall consider the programs developed by Regional Sea Conventions. Also, the general idea of 
establishing pilot regions was not dropped completely, albeit the formulation about supportive 
actions which the regions in question could expect from the Commission was made rather 
vague and thus is not likely to become a basis for concrete measures.
The debate about whether and to which extent the macro-regional regulation level should 
be considered in the MSFD reveals that more ambitious EU protection policies for the Baltic Sea 
do not only fail due to the lack of political will to improve environmental conditions. They are 
also impeded by differences member states and Community actors have regarding institutional 
preferences and general targets concerning the European integration process. When developing 
environmental legislation, concerns about regional specific requirements have to be kept in 
balance with the interest of keeping all European regions on the same track. In other words, 
the Baltic Sea environment suffers from the fact that the institutional and legal instruments 
that might be beneficial for the Baltic Sea are being refused since they do not provide useful 
tools in the case of the Mediterranean Sea. 
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A new dimension of the European policy-making was opened up in 2009 by the adoption of 
the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, which is the first in a series of envisaged strategies 
for various European macro-regions. The Baltic Sea Strategy has the chance to address some 
of the structural weaknesses of the EU political system that so far have prevented effective 
protection policies regarding the sea’s marine environment. Of major importance is the stra-
tegy’s inherent potential to facilitate cross-sectoral policy coordination (European Commission 
2012: 7). This has turned out already during the preparation phase which involved an extensive 
cooperation across 19 different Directorates-General – an experience that was unprecedented 
in the working procedures of the European Commission13. Nevertheless, the Baltic Sea Stra-
tegy cannot be regarded as an adequate compensation for the failure to establish the  Baltic 
Sea pilot area under the MSFD. It neither includes the adaptation of the EU law towards the 
environmental requirements of the Baltic Sea nor allocates additional financial resources to 
support the adoption of urgently needed measures, e.g., to increase the purification levels of 
Wastewater Treatment Plants or to radically redesign the CAP throughout the Baltic Sea region. 
In the long term, however, the Strategy may initiate certain beneficial developments within 
the target region. As a side effect, the region may be provided with better opportunities to 
influence decision-making processes within the EU central institutions (Schymik 2011: 10). 
The Baltic Sea region thus serves as a testing ground for the development of policies and 
management strategies which, if successful, can ultimately inspire the development of new EU 
legislation (European Commission 2011: 8). Moreover, cooperation experience may lead to an 
increasingly similar perception of common regional challenges among the affected EU member 
states. This may encourage them to take concerted actions and push jointly for the Baltic Sea 
protection at the European level, thereby increasing their bargaining power14. 
CONCLUSIONS
Eutrophication of the open sea is not a major problem for any other European marine en-
vironment apart from that of the Baltic Sea. Consequently, one cannot expect that marine 
eutrophication will ever be on top of the European environmental policy agenda. It is all the 
more important to increase the knowledge of the particular sensitivity of the Baltic Sea within 
the EU’s central institutions and in particular the European Commission. Normally, it should 
be a task of environmental organizations to point out urgent environmental challenges. It 
therefore constitutes a great weakness that the serious state of the Baltic Sea is not being 
adequately addressed by the NGO sector at the European level. To overcome this situation, it 
would be crucial to eliminate the dividing line that virtually exists between the environmental 
networks acting in the Baltic Sea regional context and those that are engaged in pan-European 
policy-making in Brussels.
13  Official, Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European Union, December 2009.
14  A positive example of this mechanism can be seen in the Commission’s proposal for a stricter legislation 
on phosphates in detergents, which was made in 2010 in response to a joint pressure from the member states 
that participate in the Baltic Sea and Danube Strategies. See European Commission (2010: 5).
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Since marine eutrophication in itself cannot be expected to become a driving force within 
the European policy making, it is important to connect the issue to other, more prominent 
environmental topics and emphasize potential double benefits. For instance, increasing fertilizer 
efficiency should not only be regarded as a measure to combat eutrophication, but also put in 
the “more popular” context of combating climate change. Moreover, economic advantages, for 
example, in terms of lower expenses for fertilizer application and for drinking water treatment, 
could be emphasized. Double benefits from combating eutrophication, among others, also 
emerge in the tourism and fisheries sectors (Österblom et al. 2010). 
Pointing out its interrelations with the other policy areas may also help to overcome the 
fragmentation of policy making, which otherwise constitutes a major disadvantage of the EU’s 
political system, in particular when it comes to the integration of environmental considera-
tions into the CAP. For many decades, decision-making had been taking place within a rather 
isolated policy network consisting of the Agricultural and Fisheries Council at the centre and 
interrelated experts from the European Commission’s DG Agri and the European farmers’ lobby 
organizations. Including the CAP into cross-sectoral approaches has proven to be extremely 
difficult due to the policy’s exceptional position within the EU’s broader institutional structure. 
Thus, it is important to make an optimal use of the points of access to CAP decisions that the 
system nonetheless provides for non-agricultural actors. These points are found within the 
EU’s supranational bodies, such as the Commission, the Parliament, and the European Court 
of Justice, which have often pushed for environmental progress in order to improve public 
perception and increase their institutional legitimacy (Bongardt 2007: 66). In this regard, it is 
important to note that the European Parliament, which previously has only been involved on 
the basis of the consultation procedure, now has the right of co-decision in agricultural affairs 
through the Lisbon Treaty. Given the generally high profile which the Parliament has developed 
as an advocate for environmental protection, this may open up new opportunities to shift 
discussions on agricultural reforms away from closed circles and to make them a topic of public 
debates. However, it will be essential to avoid the possibility that the environmental profile of 
the European Parliament will suffer from its enhanced legal position by the fact that the latter 
will probably encourage farmers’ interest groups to strengthen their efforts to influence the 
parliamentarians (Knill and Liefferink 2007: 99).
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